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I. INTRODUCTION
On November 3, 2012, Lt. Col. James Wilkerson (“Wilkerson”), a
31st Fighter Wing Inspector General and F-16 pilot, was convicted of
aggravated sexual assault1 and sentenced to one year in jail2 and dismissed3
from the Air Force.4 On February 26, 2013, only three months after
Wilkerson was sentenced, Lt. Gen. Craig Franklin5 dismissed the case against
Wilkerson.6 Despite a full investigation and Wilkerson’s failed polygraph
examination, which was submitted to a jury of four colonels and one
1
Wilkerson was accused of entering the bedroom of a houseguest, groping her breasts, and digitally
penetrating her until the woman, who had met the Wilkerson that evening at a party, awoke to the assault
upon discomfort and left the Wilkerson home, shoeless, in the middle of the night. Nancy Montgomery,
Case Dismissed Against Aviano IG Convicted of Sexual Assault, STARS & STRIPES (Feb. 27, 2013),
http://www.stripes.com/news/air-force/case-dismissed-against-aviano-ig-convicted-of-sexual-assault1.209797.
2
The jury had broad sentencing discretion, ranging from no punishment to confinement up to thirty
years. Nancy Montgomery, Former IG Gets 1-Year Sentence, Dismissal for Sexual Assault, STARS &
STRIPES (Nov. 3, 2012), http://www.stripes.com/news/former-ig-gets-1-year-sentence-dismissal-for-sexua
l-assault-1.195865.
3
Equivalent to a dishonorable discharge and making him ineligible to receive retirement benefits and
pay. Id.
4
Id.
5
Montgomery, supra note 1. Lt. Gen. Craig Franklin was the Third Air Force Commander and the
convening authority of Wilkerson’s court-martial, as well as a former commander of the 31st Fighter Wing
who is also an F-16 pilot. Id.
6
Id.
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lieutenant colonel, Lt. Gen. Franklin concluded that “the entire body of
evidence was insufficient to meet the burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.”7 In addition to the dismissal of the entire case, Wilkerson was
selected for promotion to colonel and permitted to return to “full-duty
status.”8 Nancy Parrish, president of Protect Our Defenders,9 stated, “It’s a
classic example of the broken military justice system[] . . . . It’s absolute
command discretion over the rule of law.”10 The organization is one of many
advocacy groups and congressional members calling for the removal of
prosecutorial authority over sexual assault cases from within the chain-ofcommand.11
Sexual assault is a major cause of concern within the military,
evidenced by the fact that the Department of Defense has implemented a
comprehensive policy in order to prevent sexual assault in the Armed
Forces.12 Sexual crimes within the military jumped 34.5% from 19,300
assaults in Fiscal Year (“FY”) 2010 to 26,000 assaults in FY 2012.13 The
percentage of victims who report their assaults dropped significantly from
13.5% in 2011 to 9.8% in 2012, a 27% reporting reduction.14 In addition, the
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (“SAPRO”) reports that of
the victims who chose not to report, 47% expressed that fear of retaliation or
reprisal was the reason for not reporting their abuse, while another 43% were
influenced by the negative experiences of other victims who reported their
abuse.15 Seventy-four percent of female victims and 60% of male victims
indicated a perception of “one or more barriers to reporting sexual assault.”16
The overwhelming majority of victims who reported a sexual assault
indicated that they experienced professional, social, or administrative
retaliation.17
Id.
Id.
9
Protect Our Defenders is a human rights organization working with victims, survivors, their
families, and retired military to reform how the Department of Defense handles sexual harassment, rape,
and sexual assault within the military. About Protect Our Defenders, PROTECT OUR DEFENDERS, http://ww
w.protectourdefenders.com/about/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2016); Montgomery, supra note 1.
10
Montgomery, supra note 1.
11
Id.
12
SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION & RESPONSE, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ABOUT SAPRO (2016), http://w
ww.sapr.mil/index.php/about.
13
SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION & RESPONSE, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY: FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 13 (2013), http://www.sa
pr.mil/public/docs/reports/FY12_DoD_SAPRO_Annual_Report_on_Sexual_Assault-volume_one.pdf
[hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2012].
14
Get the Facts on Military Rape, Assault and Other Sexual Offenses, PROTECT OUR DEFENDERS,
http://protectourdefenders.com/images/POD_FactSheet.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2016) [hereinafter Get
the Facts].
15
Id.; see also ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2012, supra note 13, at 27.
16
Get the Facts, supra note 14; see also SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION & RESPONSE, U.S. DEP’T OF
DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY: FISCAL YEAR
2013, at 54 (2014), http://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/FY13_DoD_SAPRO_Annual_Report_on_S
exual_Assault.pdf [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2013].
17
Get the Facts, supra note 14; see also ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2012, supra note 13, at 27.
7
8
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The United States military is a unique entity with a very specific
mission: defense of the nation.18 The military is fundamentally different from
the civilian world because of its sole mission and very distinct charge; as such,
a separate and distinct system of justice is crucial for the successful
undertaking of its mission.19 Each incident of sexual assault in the military is
detrimental to the achievement of that mission.20 Despite the current
Department of Defense initiatives to address the issue and promote the
prevention of sexual assault, the Department of Defense admits that sexual
assault is still “one of the most serious challenges facing our military.”21 The
obvious question presented, then, becomes, “What more can be done to
remedy the poor handling of sexual assault cases in the military?”
The answer is simple, but has encountered substantial resistance from
high-ranking military officials. The Department of Defense ought to establish
an independent agency responsible for prosecutorial discretion in military
sexual assault cases; in so doing, the military will take real steps toward
curtailing sexual assault in the military by creating a system of accountability
that prosecutes and punishes sexual assault while simultaneously deterring
others from engaging in similar criminal activity. Such a system of justice
will be concerned with fairness and objectivity, lending itself to maintaining
trust amongst service members, and will ultimately prove beneficial to the
mission.
This Comment will first provide an overview of the current process
of handling sexual assault cases as they arise within the armed forces and
discuss the need for a separate military system of justice. This examination
will address the major areas of concern and the impact these problems have
on victims of sexual assault. Second, this Comment will review the measures
taken thus far by the Department of Defense to promote the prevention of
sexual assault. This examination will review the principal justifications the
Department of Defense employs to defend the current practice of
prosecutorial authority remaining within the chain-of-command.22 Finally,
this Comment will address the many benefits of removing prosecutorial
authority from the chain-of-command and propose additional provisions
necessary in order for the Department of Defense to more effectively combat
sexual assault.
II. BACKGROUND
Part II of this Comment more thoroughly frames the problem for
18
CHARLES D. STIMSON, SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY: UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM AND
HOW TO FIX IT, at v (2013).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2013, supra note 16, at 6.
22
SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION & RESPONSE, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., MISSION & HISTORY (2016),
http://www.sapr.mil/index.php/about/mission-and-history [hereinafter MISSION & HISTORY].
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sexual assault in the military and discusses the importance of a separate
system of military justice. This Part also introduces the reader to the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, the Manual for Courts-Martial, the very extensive
court-martial procedures, as well as Department of Defense investigative
units. Finally, it will examine current and past initiatives to prevent sexual
assault in the military.
A. Sexual Assault in the Military: Framing the Problem
According to the Department of Defense Annual Report on Sexual
Assault in the Military Fiscal Year 2013, the military received 5,061 reports
of sexual assault.23 Three thousand seven hundred sixty-eight of those reports
were unrestricted, while 1,293 were restricted.24 The restricted reports are
immediately funneled out of the process with no adjudication.25 Among the
3,768 unrestricted reports, 3,234 perpetrators were identified.26 Of those
perpetrators, only 2,149 were considered for possible action, with the
remaining funneled out due to the commander determining the allegations
unfounded and other reasons.27 Of the 2,149 remaining perpetrators, charges
were only initiated against 838 perpetrators, 210 perpetrators received nonjudicial punishments, 56 were administratively discharged, and 83
experienced adverse administrative actions.28 Of the 5,061 reports of sexual
assault in Fiscal Year 2013, only 370 perpetrators were convicted of a
charge at trial and only 274 perpetrators were confined to jail.29 Interestingly,
not all perpetrators who were convicted were convicted of sexual assault.30
Staff Sergeant Stace Nelson, a U.S. Marine Corps Naval Criminal
Investigative Service Agent (“NCIS”), admitted that most cases are pled
down because “the military does not like to prosecute people and keep them
as felony convictions.”31
Although the sheer numbers certainly provide cause for concern, the
numbers alone do not adequately frame the problem. The military culture
itself heightens the impact that sexual assault has in the military in comparison
to sexual assault in the civilian world. Brigadier General Loree Sutton, a
psychiatrist in the U.S. Army, indicates that because the military is a relatively
closed system, the military is a prime “target-rich environment” for a sexual
predator.32 This is in large part due to the catch and release system the military

23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2013, supra note 16, at 67.
Id.
THE INVISIBLE WAR, at 42:48 (Chain Camera Pictures Jan. 20, 2012).
ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2013, supra note 16, at 67.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 83.
Id.
THE INVISIBLE WAR, supra note 25, at 1:28:48–1:29:00.
Id. at 31:42.
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employs.33
NCIS Staff Sergeant Nelson acknowledged that rapists in the military
are much more capable and dangerous criminals; the military rapist who is
investigated is educated regarding the process and understands how to do the
crime without doing the time.34 Helen Benedict, author of The Lonely Soldier,
stated during an interview:
Most rapists are repetitive criminals. It is a kind of crime that
has an obsessive quality so people do it again and again. So
the tragedy of that is that every one of these guys that gets off
free will be doing it to other women again and again, often
for years and years and years.35
Russell Strand, Chief of the Family Advocacy Law Enforcement Training
Division of the U.S. Army, attaches a number to the repetitive criminal to
which Helen Benedict referred. He stated, “The average sex offender in their
lifetime has about 300 victims and the vast majority of sex offenders will
never be caught.”36 Staff Sergeant Nelson also properly identifies that this
catch and release system, which allows predators to repetitively commit
sexual assault crimes, is not solely a military problem. 37 Approximately 5%
of reported sexual assaults result in conviction; even fewer perpetrators, only
4%, end up on the sex offender registry.38 Under the current system, these
repetitive criminals are able to get out of the military without a felony record
and without any warning to the public of sexual assault transgressions in the
military. Former Air Force Chief Prosecutor Col. Don Christensen
acknowledged that military sex offenders “know that they can commit these
offenses with almost impunity.”39
While sexual assault has a devastating presence in the civilian world,
it is an extremely abhorrent and discounted reality in the military. General
Martin E. Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, spoke to First
and Second Class Air Force Cadets on the importance of character, trust, and
faith in the military.40 Gen. Dempsey articulated that “[t]rust holds the
33
Id. at 1:29:18. The military routinely “investigates” reports of sexual assault only to release the
perpetrator and close the investigation, allowing perpetrators to be much more the wiser concerning the
investigative procedures and the inner workings of the military justice system. Id. at 1:29:20–1:29:35.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 1:27:46–1:28:03.
36
Id. at 1:28:04.
37
Id. at 1:29:15.
38
ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2013, supra note 16, at 83.
39
Remarks from Protect Our Defenders President Don Christensen at Military Justice Improvement
Act Press Conference with Senator Kirsten Gillibrand, PROTECT OUR DEFENDERS (Dec. 2, 2014),
http://www.protectourdefenders.com/remarks-from-protect-our-defenders-president-don-christensen-atmilitary-justice-improvement-act-press-conference-with-senator-kirsten-gillibrand/ [hereinafter Remarks
from Protect Our Defenders President].
40
Amber Baillie, ‘Trust Holds Our Profession Together’: U.S.’s Top Military Officer Encourages
Academy Cadets to Never Lose Faith in Their Military Careers, U.S. AIR FORCE ACAD., http://www.usafa.
af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123370062 (last updated Nov. 8, 2013).
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military profession together.”41 Army Chief of Staff General Ray Odierno
spoke at an Army Annual Meeting and expressed similar sentiments.42
General Odierno articulated the practical importance of trust and
unit cohesion, explaining that military members “have to be there for each
other in the most stringent of conditions. You have to believe that they will
be there for you at the most important times. You have to work as a team and
that trust must be built over time, and it must be earned . . . .”43 Sexual assault
destroys trust and unit cohesion by breaking down the individual, breeding a
new culture of fear, and impacting the victim in ways unknown in the civilian
world. For example, a sexual assault victim in the military may be forced to
work closely with his or her accuser or may face retaliation for a report of
sexual assault, two common practices currently impacting sexual assault
victims in the military. Additionally, unlike civilian victims, a military sexual
assault victim is unable to bring a cause of action against the military for harm
incurred incident to military service,44 including the military’s failure to
protect its service members from sexual assault.
Aside from eroding trust and breaking down the mission of the
military, sexual assault in the military significantly impacts the physical and
psychological well-being of military members and their families. Kori Cioca
of the U.S. Coast Guard was raped and beaten by her supervisor, which
resulted in a dislocated jaw requiring a partial bone replacement.45 She has
been on a soft diet for five years and still has not received surgery or
benefits.46 Marine Lance Cpl. Jeremiah Arbogast was drugged and raped by
a fellow Marine who served no prison time upon conviction due to his 23
years of admirable service.47 Lance Cpl. Jeremiah Arbogast was ostracized
after his report of sexual assault and later medically discharged as a result of
mental health problems resulting from the sexual assault.48 Consequently,
Lance Cpl. Arbogast suffered from depression and post-traumatic stress,
which led to a paralyzing self-inflicted gunshot wound.49 Department of
Defense statistics indicate that “[victims] who have been raped in the military
have a PTSD [post-traumatic stress disorder] rate higher than [soldiers]
who’ve been in combat.”50

Id.
Raymond J. Piper, CSA: Trust is Bedrock of Army Profession, U.S. ARMY (Oct. 26, 2012), http://ww
w.army.mil/article/89904/CSA__Trust_is_bedrock_of_Army_Profession/.
43
Id.
44
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
45
THE INVISIBLE WAR, supra note 25, at 15:33.
46
Id. at 15:53.
47
Chris Carroll, Senate Panel Explores Links Between Sex Assault, PTSD and Suicide, STARS &
STRIPES (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.stripes.com/news/senate-panel-explores-links-between-sex-assaultptsd-and-suicide-1.270119.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
THE INVISIBLE WAR, supra note 25, at 34:27.
41
42
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Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta acknowledged the drastic problem
and called for a zero tolerance policy for sexual assault in the military,51
explaining that “[sexual assault] is a crime that hurts survivors, their families,
their friends and their units . . . .”52 Moreover, “sexual assault reduces overall
military readiness.”53 In these military units that tolerate sexual assault and
refuse to actively combat the perpetrators, incidents of sexual assault triple.54
Although high ranking military officials claim that the military is “in the
process of instituting . . . changes,”55 the problem is more accurately reflected
by Peter Jennings’ sentiments characterizing the Navy Tailhook scandal,
stating, “A great wall of silence ha[s] gone up to protect the guilty.”56 This
must change.
B. The Need for a Separate System of Justice
In June of 1775, the Second Continental Congress created the
Continental Army.57 On the same day, Congress also initiated a committee
to recommend rules and regulations for the government of the army. 58 The
committee, comprised of George Washington and four others, drafted and
proposed 69 separate “Articles of War” which were approved on June 30,
1775, and listed the types of offenses that could be tried by a court-martial.59
For example, Article VII specifies the following:
Any officer or soldier, who shall strike his superior officer,
or draw, or offer to draw, or shall lift up any weapon, or offer
any violence against him, being in the execution of his office,
on any pretence whatsoever, or shall disobey any lawful
commands of his superior officer, shall suffer such
punishment as shall, according to the nature of his offence,
be ordered by the sentence of a general court-martial.60
Only days after George Washington was appointed General and
Id. at 43:31–43:40.
Claudette Roulo, DOD to Revise Sexual Assault Prevention Training, U.S. DEP’T DEF. (Sept. 25,
2012), http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=118000.
53
Id.
54
Anne G. Sadler et al., Factors Associated with Women’s Risk of Rape in the Military Environment,
43 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 262, 268 (2003).
55
Interview with General John Jumper, U.S. Air Force. THE INVISIBLE WAR, supra note 25, at 43:01–
43:05.
56
Id. at 41:20–41:23.
57
A military force arising out of the dispute between the United Kingdom and inhabitants of the newly
formed colonies in North America that existed for more than two centuries and is now known as the United
States Army. GREGORY E. MAGGS & LISA M. SCHENCK, MODERN MILITARY JUSTICE: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1 (2012).
58
Id.; see also 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 113 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed.,
2d ed. 1775).
59
MAGGS & SCHENCK, supra note 57, at 1; see also JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS,
supra note 58, at 112–23.
60
MAGGS & SCHENCK, supra note 57, at 1–2; see also JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS,
supra note 58, at 113.
51
52
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Commander-in-Chief of the Army, he appointed a Judge Advocate of the
Continental Army.61 The need for a separate military justice system is
evidenced in the fact that the separate rules and regulations and the
appointment of legal officers were instituted immediately following the
formation of the new army.62
Two primary reasons for the existence of a separate military system
of justice are discipline and mobility.63 The Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognized that “[m]ilitary law[] . . . is a jurisprudence which exists separate
and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment.”64
The Court has indicated that the military is “a specialized society separate
from civilian society” which has “laws and traditions of its own [developed]
during its long history.”65 Additionally, the primary purpose of the military
is to fight or be prepared “to fight wars should the occasion arise.”66 In order
to prepare for and carry out its vital purpose, “the military must insist upon a
respect for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civilian life.”67 Given
such need for duty and discipline, the military prosecutes many crimes that
are unique to military life and would not be appropriately considered in the
civilian system. For example, military members can be prosecuted for
adultery, not going to work on time, and disrespecting a supervisor. 68
Ultimately, the military may prosecute a service member for any behavior that
the military deems inappropriate under the punitive article 10 U.S.C. §
933.133, Conduct Unbecoming of an Officer and a Gentleman.69 The laws
governing military disciple have a long history rooted in unique military
experiences and needs that are as powerful today as in the past.70
Concerning mobility, the military’s base of operations sees no
boundaries, often operating in locations where civil authority does not exist.71
As a practical matter, when troops are deployed overseas, missions cannot be
put on hold in order to address a disciplinary problem; likewise, the problem
cannot be ignored until troops come home.72 The Court has recognized that
“[c]ourt-martial jurisdiction sprang from the belief that within the military
ranks there is need for a prompt, ready-at-hand means of compelling
obedience and order.”73
MAGGS & SCHENCK, supra note 57, at 2.
Id.
63
Id.
64
Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953); see also Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744 (1974).
65
Parker, 417 U.S. at 743.
66
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
67
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975).
68
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES
62 (2012) [hereinafter MCM]; 10 U.S.C. §§ 886.86, 889.89 (2012).
69
10 U.S.C. § 933.133 (2012).
70
Schlesinger, 420 U.S. at 757.
71
MAGGS & SCHENCK, supra note 57, at 2.
72
Id.
73
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22 (1955).
61
62
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C. The Uniform Code of Military Justice
The military justice system varied among the branches prior to 1950.
However, in 1950, Congress enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(“UCMJ”) in order to create a single, comprehensive system of military
justice for all members of the uniformed services of the United States,
including the Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, Navy, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Commissioned Corps, and Public
Health Service Commissioned Corps.74 The UCMJ closely resembles the
original Articles of War, discussed supra, which are codified at 10 U.S.C. §
801 to § 941.75 While the UCMJ contains many of the same provisions from
the Articles of War, the UCMJ also contains provisions targeting modern
forms of misconduct that were unknown in 1775, such as drunk driving.76
The UCMJ also dictates investigative procedures, court-martial jurisdiction,
trial procedure, punishment, sentencing, and post-trial procedure and
review.77
D. The Manual for Courts-Martial
The Manual for Courts-Martial (“MCM”) is a comprehensive
military attorney’s manual78 with the primary purpose of providing for “just
determination of every proceeding relating to trial by court-martial.”79 The
MCM contains the Rules of Court-Martial (“R.C.M.”) and Military Rules of
Evidence (“Mil. R. Evid.”).80 “These rules [closely] resemble the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence,” and serve
the same primary function with the exception of the court-martial
procedures.81
E. Court-Martial Procedures
Once an offense is reported, one of two actions may be taken:
apprehension or an initial report.82 The next step in the process is determining
whether to impose a pretrial restraint83 on the service member.84 Next, the
case goes to the commander for immediate disposition.85 Pursuant to R.C.M.
306 and 402, the commander may take no action, take an administrative
About, UNIFORM CODE MIL. JUST., http://www.ucmj.us/about-the-ucmj (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
MAGGS & SCHENCK, supra note 57, at 4; see also 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–941.
76
MAGGS & SCHENCK, supra note 57, at 5; see also 10 U.S.C. § 911.111.
77
See 10 U.S.C. §§ 832, 836, 855, 859; see also Structure, UNIFORM CODE MIL. JUST., http://www.uc
mj.us/structure-of-the-ucmj (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
78
MAGGS & SCHENCK, supra note 57, at 5.
79
MCM, supra note 68, at II-1.
80
MAGGS & SCHENCK, supra note 57, at 5; see also MCM, supra note 68, at 1–3.
81
MAGGS & SCHENCK, supra note 57, at 5–6.
82
Id. at 12.
83
Pursuant to R.C.M. 304, a “pretrial restraint ‘may consist of conditions on liberty, restriction in lieu
of arrest, arrest, or confinement.’” Id. at 13.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 12–13.
74
75
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action,86 issue a non-judicial punishment,87 or prefer charges88 and forward the
case onto additional court-martial proceedings.89 If the commander prefers
charges, he would complete a “charge sheet” designating the type of courtmartial90 having convening authority over the case.91
The convening authority would then have similar options for
disposition of the case, including forwarding charges to another type of courtmartial convening authority for further disposition.92 The convening
authority also has the ability to order a “pretrial investigation”93 in order to
secure more information for the purpose of appropriately disposing the case.94
A staff judge advocate would then review the investigation report and make
recommendations to the convening authority.95 If the convening authority
decides to refer charges to a court-martial, the trial will closely resemble a
civilian criminal trial.96 A court-martial begins with an arraignment, followed
by a trial on the merits, unless the accused enters a guilty plea.97 Following
the trial on the merits is a finding of guilt.98 If the accused is found guilty, a
decision on the sentence will follow, along with an announcement of the
sentence.99
The accused may request a trial by a judge or by a panel.100 The
make-up of the panel, however, is very unlike a civilian jury in that “[i]ts
members . . . consist of officers or enlisted members [selected] by the
convening authority to hear the case.”101 The accused may request that one86
Id. at 13. Under R.C.M. 306, the commander may address “misconduct with ‘administrative
corrective measures,’ [including] counseling, admonitions, reprimands, exhortations, disapprovals,
criticisms, censures, reproaches, rebukes, or extra military instruction.” Id.
87
Id. Commonly referred to as an “Article 15,” Chapter 3, Article 15 of the UCMJ authorizes “the
commander to impose minor punishments on soldiers for violations of the UCMJ, without trying them by
court-martial unless the accused insists on a court-martial [proceeding].” Id.
88
Id. Pursuant to R.C.M. 307, the commander “prefers charges by putting them in writing, stating
that he or she has personal knowledge of or has investigated the [circumstances] set forth in the charges
and specifications, and [then] signing them under oath,” generally completed through the issuance of a
“charge sheet. Id.
89
Id. at 12–13.
90
“[T]here are three types of courts-martial: a summary court-martial, a special court-martial, [and] a
general court-martial. These three types . . . differ in the formality” of their proceedings, as well as the
types of penalties imposed. Id. at 16 (internal citation omitted). A summary court-martial is very informal
and imposes modest sentences while a general court-martial is an adversary criminal trial conducted
according to formal rules of evidence and procedure and is typically convened for more serious offenses
and imposes any lawful sentence authorized for the offense, including life imprisonment and the death
penalty. Id. at 16–17.
91
Id. at 16.
92
Id. at 12.
93
Also commonly referred to as an “Article 32 investigation,” pursuant to R.C.M. 405. MCM, supra
note 68, at II-38.
94
MAGGS & SCHENCK, supra note 57, at 17–18.
95
Id. at 12.
96
Id. at 18.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
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third of the panel members consist of enlisted members; however, the
convening authority still retains ultimate authority.102 Finally, the panel does
not have to be unanimous in its decision; rather, a finding of guilt only
requires a two-thirds vote.103
If found guilty, the accused has two opportunities for a review of his
conviction.104 First, the convening authority will have the opportunity to
review the trial record and can approve the findings or dismiss the findings.105
The convening authority may also approve the sentence, mitigate the
sentence, or disapprove the sentence.106 Finally, the accused may also seek
review of his conviction from a court of appeals.107
F. Department of Defense Investigative Units
The UCMJ details the investigation procedures each branch adheres
to when investigating matters concerning a court-martial charge.108 The
UCMJ requires a “thorough and impartial investigation of all the matters”
pertaining to the alleged offense.109 The investigation includes “a
recommendation as to the disposition” of the case, as well.110 The Department
of Defense authorizes the various military branches to carry out such
investigative services.111 The four major Department of Defense investigative
agencies include the U.S. Army Intelligence Command, the U.S. Army
Criminal Investigative Command, the Naval Investigative Service, and the
Office of Special Investigations, Air Force.112 While the Department of
Defense has consolidated many investigative capabilities into the Defense
Security Service (“DSS”), formerly known as the Defense Investigative
Service (“DIS”), the independent investigative agencies of each branch
remain operative today.113
The Air Force Office of Special Investigations (“AFOSI”)114 is a
federal law enforcement agency responsible for criminal investigations,

Id.
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 12.
106
Id. But see discussion of 2014 changes to the UCMJ, infra Section III.B.2.a.
107
MAGGS & SCHENCK, supra note 57, at 12.
108
10 U.S.C. § 832.32 (2012).
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
James B. Burch, Investigation – Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), OFF. INSPECTOR
GEN., U.S. DEP’T DEF., http://dodig.mil/INV_DCIS/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 10, 2016); see also CRIM.
INVESTIGATIONS PROGRAM, DEP’T AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 71-101, at 1 (2015), http://static.e
-publishing.af.mil/production/1/saf_ig/publication/afi71-101v1/afi71-101v1.pdf.
112
Burch, supra note 111.
113
Id.
114
The investigative units of each branch operate very similarly; however, for the purposes of
conciseness, this Comment has chosen the AFOSI as a model example of the investigative units and their
general responsibilities and operations.
102
103
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among other investigative activities and operations, within the Air Force. 115
The field-operating agency is under the direction and guidance of The
Inspector General of the Air Force.116 AFOSI units are given the authority
and independent discretion to assume investigative responsibility when it
concerns Air Force or Department of Defense personnel, property, or
resources.117 The AFOSI is responsible for initiating investigations of all
sexual assault offenses that occur within their jurisdiction.118
The AFOSI has eight field investigation regions around the world,
each comprised of subordinate field units, including squadrons, detachments,
and operating locations.119 In total, AFOSI operates 144 units in the United
States and 63 units overseas.120 While each unit serves the investigative needs
of nearby major commands, the AFOSI unit and its personnel operate
independent of those commands and their chains-of-command flow directly
to AFOSI headquarters in Quantico, Virginia.121 The completely separate
chain-of-command organization ensures unbiased investigations.
Another key contributing factor to “achieving an efficient, effective
and unbiased investigative process” involves the practice of masking rank and
grade of AFOSI agents.122 Since AFOSI agents often interact with individuals
who are both junior and senior in grade to them, often in an adversarial
capacity, the issue of rank cannot impede the collection of information and
evidence during the course of criminal investigations.123
G. Sexual Assault Prevention Initiatives in the Military
In 2004, the Department of Defense, at the direction of the former
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, reviewed the “process for [the]
treatment and care of victims of sexual assault in the Military . . . .”124 Upon
review, the Department of Defense assembled a task force125 assigned to
further investigate the process and return with recommendations.126 The task
force identified 35 key findings relevant to the then-current sexual assault
policies and programs and proposed nine broad recommendations for

CRIM. INVESTIGATIONS PROGRAM, supra note 111, at 5.
Id. at 8.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 15.
119
Air Force Office of Special Investigations, AIR FORCE OFF. SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS (Oct. 23,
2015), http://www.osi.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=4848.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
CRIM. INVESTIGATIONS PROGRAM, supra note 111, at 9.
123
See id.
124
MISSION & HISTORY, supra note 22.
125
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., TASK FORCE REPORT ON CARE FOR VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT, at viii
(2004), http://www .sapr.mil /public/docs/reports /task-force-report- for-care-of-victims- of-sa-2004.pdf
[hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
126
MISSION & HISTORY, supra note 22.
115
116
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corrective action.127 One of the task force’s recommendations for immediate
action was for the Department of Defense to “[e]stablish a single point of
accountability for all sexual assault policy matters within the Department of
Defense.”128 “This led to the [creation] of the Joint Task Force for Sexual
Assault Prevention and Response . . . .”129 The task force worked on a
comprehensive sexual assault and prevention policy that incorporated
recommendations from the original task force.130
By 2005, the task force transitioned into a permanent office, the
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office, or SAPRO.131 Pursuant to
the original task force’s recommendation, SAPRO serves as the single point
of accountability for all sexual assault policy matters.132 One of the primary
components of SAPRO involves conducting and reviewing sexual assaultrelated research and reports, as well as reporting its findings to Congress. 133
One report issued out of SAPRO is the Workplace and Gender Relations
Survey of Active Duty Members (“WGRA”).134 This research is conducted
annually and reports are generated approximately every two years.135 For
example, in 2012, the WGRA survey found that unwanted sexual contact
increased significantly for active duty women from 4.4% in 2010 to 6.1% in
2012.136 SAPRO also provides an annual report to Congress of its findings;
the most recent report being the Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2013
Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military.137
III. ANALYSIS
The military exists for one reason and only one reason––to defend the
nation. In order to accomplish this critical mission, military members must
be combat-ready and combat-effective.139 Good order and discipline are
essential components in carrying out the mission.140 Because of its unique
dynamic, the military has its own system of justice apart from its civilian
counterpart.141 The military justice system exists to assist the military in its
138

TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 125, at viii.
Id. at xi.
MISSION & HISTORY, supra note 22.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Fact Sheet: DMDC Survey, SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION & RESPONSE, U.S. DEP’T DEF. 1, 1
(2013), http://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/research/WGRA_Survey_Fact_Sheet.pdf.
135
SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION & RESPONSE, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., RESEARCH & REPORTS (2016),
http://www.sapr.mil/index.php/research.
136
Fact Sheet: DMDC Survey, supra note 134, at 2.
137
ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2013, supra note 16, at 12.
138
STIMSON, supra note 18, at v.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
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mission to defend the nation.142
Sexual assault harms the mission.143 Sexual assault in the military
“has a uniquely greater damaging effect . . . that even one incident is
unacceptable.”144 While promoting justice and advancing victims’ rights may
seem like the reasonable reason for this treatment, these worthy justifications
are not behind the military’s understanding of the problem; rather, sexual
assault is detrimental to the mission.145 Sexual assault is “detrimental to
morale, destroy[s] unit cohesion, show[s] disrespect for the chain of
command, and damage[s] the military as a whole . . . .”146 The mission
requires military members to completely trust one another and the chain-ofcommand; however, sexual assault destroys trust and diminishes the
military’s ability to remain combat-ready and combat-effective.147
A. Current Process of Handling Sexual Assault Cases
1. Sexual Assault Reporting Options are Often Unachievable for Many
Service Members
If an individual has been sexually assaulted, the military member has
specific reporting options to consider.148 The primary reporting options are
Restricted Reporting and Unrestricted Reporting.149 Restricted Reporting is
only available to active duty military members and adult dependents.150 The
process is confidential and goes directly to a Sexual Assault Response
Coordinator (“SARC”) in lieu of contacting law enforcement or the
commander.151 The military member will also receive medical care if he or
she goes to the base hospital.152 Evidence can be collected under Restricted
Reporting and the military member has the option to modify the reporting
option to Unrestricted Reporting at any time.153 Restricted Reporting
channels the sexual assault case into a path of no adjudication.
Unrestricted Reporting is available to all personnel and cases are
handled with discreetness, sharing information only on a “need to know”
basis.154 The military member may receive medical care at any hospital he or
Id.
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE, SEXUAL ASSAULT RESPONSE COORDINATOR (SARC)
(2016), http://www.wpafb.af.mil/units/sarc/.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id.
142
143
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she chooses.155 Evidence is collected, thereby initiating a criminal
investigation.156 As such, the military member does not have the option to
modify the reporting option to Restricted Reporting.157
Under both reporting options, the victim is urged to go to a military
treatment facility.158 In order to protect evidence, the victim is asked not to
“shower, brush [his or her] teeth, put on make-up, eat, drink, or change . . .
clothes until advised to do so.”159 Much like the sexual assault itself, the
victim remains out of control during the reporting process and may experience
feelings of depression, anxiety or shame that victims often experience to some
degree after sexual assault.160
While these processes are the official military reporting options
available to a victim of sexual assault, the option is often not practical or even
achievable for many service members. Rear Admiral Anthony Kurtka,
Director of Military Personnel Plans and Policy in the U.S. Navy,
emphatically stated during an interview that “any report of sexual assault is
fully investigated in the United States Navy.” 161 Yet, many Navy service
members did not receive such a response after being sexually assaulted. Trina
McDonald, an enlisted U.S. naval service woman, arrived at an Alaskan
isolated duty base where she was drugged and raped by military police over
a nine-month period.162 Trina’s attackers screened all of her outgoing calls
and later threw her in the Bering Sea, making it clear to her they would kill
her if she reported.163 Hanna Sewell, a U.S. naval recruit who was eager to
follow in her family’s tradition of service, was locked in a hotel room and
raped by a fellow recruit.164 Hannah had the courage to report her assault only
for the investigative unit to lose her rape kit, the nurse examiner report, and
all the photos depicting her injuries.165 When contacted regarding Hannah’s
case, NCIS headquarters in Washington D.C. reported that the evidence had
since been recovered, but because the case was closed, no further
investigation or action could be taken.166
2. Investigators Routinely Fail to Appropriately Respond and Investigate
Id.
Id.
157
Id.
158
SHARP: SEXUAL HARASSMENT/ASSAULT RESPONSE & PREVENTION, FAQS (2016), http://www.se
xualassault.army.mil/faqs.cfm#question3 [hereinafter FAQS].
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
THE INVISIBLE WAR, supra note 25, at 20:44.
162
Id. at 29:35; see also Trina McDonald, Help End Military Rape Culture, POLITICO (Nov. 12, 2013,
9:19 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/11/opinion-trina-mcdonald-sexual-assault-military-rape-c
ulture-99749.html.
163
THE INVISIBLE WAR, supra note 25, at 29:35; see also McDonald, supra note 162.
164
THE INVISIBLE WAR, supra note 25, at 19:41.
165
Id. at 23:15.
166
Id. at 23:40.
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Reports of Sexual Assault
For those service members who are able to officially report sexual
assault, investigators do not appropriately respond to and investigate the
incidents. Rear Admiral Anthony Kurtka, Director of Military Personnel
Plans and Policy in the U.S. Navy, claimed during an interview, “We have
given specific training and continual training to our NCIS, Navy Criminal
Investigative Service, those investigators, on how best to respond and to
investigate those crimes.”167 Despite claims of continual training in response
and investigation practices, many service members are ignored and
investigators, although not instructed to do so by official policies, are actually
trained to make cases go away.168
Miette Wells, working in the U.S. Air Force Security Forces, stated
that “if rape cases came in, they were never given to women.”169 She
explained that men took rape cases “because [women security officers] were
too sympathetic.”170 When U.S. Naval Officer, Tia Christopher, reported her
sexual assault, she received no sympathy from a superior officer, who instead
responded with mockery and ridicule: “Do you think this is funny? Is this all
a joke to you? You’re the third girl to report rape this week. Are you guys like
all in cahoots? Do you think this is a game?”171 Sgt. Myla Haider, an
investigator in the Army Criminal Investigation Division, claimed that
investigators are not trained to properly respond to reports of sexual assault;
rather, she insisted that victims of sexual assault were perceived as
troublemakers.172 She stated, “I was ordered to advise a victim of her rights
for a false statement when I knew she wasn’t lying. I was asked to bring her
in and advise her of her rights like a criminal and interrogate her for false
statement ‘until I got the truth out of her.’”173 Captain Greg Rinckey, an
attorney for the Judge Advocate General’s Corps, admitted that often times
when a report of sexual assault was made, a cursory investigation was done
and then the victims were told to “suck it up.”174 Capt. Rinckey
acknowledged that the credibility of victims and witnesses were often
attacked and confessed that investigations quickly turned into victim witch
hunting.175
3. The Court-Martial Process Begins and the Victim is Traumatized Once
Id. at 22:56.
See generally id.
169
Id. at 22:25.
170
Id. at 22:30.
171
Id. at 25:00–25:16.
172
Id. at 21:55.
173
Id.
174
Id. at 21:26; see also A. O. Scott, For Some Who Served, an Awful Betrayal of Trust, N.Y. TIMES
(June 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/22/movies/the-invisible-war-directed-by-kirby-dick.ht
ml?_r=0.
175
THE INVISIBLE WAR, supra note 25, at 21:46.
167
168
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Again
Once an offense is reported, the case goes to the commander for an
immediate determination on how to handle the case.176 The commander has
the authority to take no action, take an administrative action, such as
counseling or internal reprimands, issue non-judicial punishment, or forward
the case onto additional court-martial proceedings and recommend that the
accused face charges.177 At this point, trial counsel178 will begin working on
the case and consulting with the investigative unit179 assigned to the case.180
The convening authority may order a pretrial investigation, at which time an
investigating officer will hear evidence and witnesses and report his findings
as to whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused
committed the offense charged.181 It is common for the victim to appear and
testify at the hearing.182 The victim has the right to an attorney, known as a
Special Victim’s Counsel, throughout the process.183 The victims, however,
are seriously impacted during these hearings. For example, a recent case
involving allegations against a Naval Academy football player184 consisted of
three days’ worth of questioning about the victim’s motivations, medical
history and apparel, which was perceived as disgraceful and degrading, as
well as a potential violation of federal rape shield statutes.185
Under the UCMJ and the R.C.M., the Defense also has the ability to
interview the victim before the court-martial proceedings.186 One story told
to Protect Our Defenders involved seven hours of questioning after seventeen
hours of travelling, and demanded the victim lift up her shirt so that the
defense counsel could see how her pants fit.187 The survivor described the
interview experience as “embarrassing, harassing, and demoralizing . . . .” 188
See MAGGS & SCHENCK, supra note 57, at 12.
Id. at 13; see also Teresa Scalzo, Sexual Assault: The Court-Martial Process and Victim’s Rights,
NAVY LIVE (Apr. 24, 2013), http://navylive.dodlive.mil/2013/04/24/sexual-assault-the-court-martial-proc
ess-and-victims-rights/.
178
A military prosecuting attorney acts as trial counsel in court-martial proceedings.
179
For example, the Air Force investigative unit is the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. The
unit conducts criminal investigations on a full spectrum of conflict and provides counterintelligence
services. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, supra note 119.
180
Scalzo, supra note 177.
181
See id.; see also MAGGS & SCHENCK, supra note 57, at 12.
182
Scalzo, supra note 177.
183
FAQS, supra note 158.
184
Helene Cooper, Former Naval Academy Football Player is Acquitted of Sexual Assault, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/21/us/former-naval-academy-football-player-is-acquit
ted-of-sexual-assault-charges.html?_r=0.
185
David Vergun, New Law Brings Changes to Uniform Code of Military Justice, U.S. ARMY (Feb.
20, 2014), http://www.army.mil/article/120622/New_law_brings_changes_to_Uniform_Code_of_Militar
y_Justice/.
186
Protect Our Defenders’ Written Statement: Response Systems to Adult Sexual Assault Crimes Panel
November 7-8, 2013 Hearing on Victims’ Services, PROTECT OUR DEFENDERS, http://www.protectourdefe
nders.com/protect-our-defenders-written-statement-response-systems-to-adult-sexual-assault-crimespanel-november-7-8-2013-hearing-on-victims-services/ (last visited Arp. 10, 2016).
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This example not only brings to light the traumatization victims experience
after the assault, but also serves to emphasize the manner in which these
interviews, to which the defense is entitled, are inappropriately conducted.
Under UCMJ and R.C.M. guidelines, the defense is entitled to this interview
and the victim does not have the option to decline.189 Military courts
acknowledge “[m]ilitary law has long been more liberal than its civilian
counterpart in disclosing the government’s case to the accused and in granting
discovery rights.”190 The only change over the last sixty years to the defense’s
seemingly unfettered right to interview a victim of sexual assault is the
interview must take place in the presence of trial counsel, a counsel for the
victim, or a sexual assault victim advocate, but only if requested by the
victim.191
Upon completion of the pretrial investigation, a staff judge advocate
reviews the investigation report and makes a recommendation to the
convening authority.192 The convening authority makes the ultimate
determination on whether to proceed to trial.193 If the convening authority
decides to refer charges to a court-martial, the trial will closely resemble a
civilian criminal trial.194 The victim will most likely have to testify at the trial
as well, which although not necessarily different from its civilian counterpart,
a military victim has likely already endured extensive questioning by defense
counsel at this point.195 Under the UCMJ, the judge or panel must be
convinced of the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before the
accused may be found guilty of sexual assault.196 If the accused is found
guilty, the case proceeds to sentencing, at which time the victim may be called
to testify yet again.197
B. Current Initiatives and Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Efforts
1. Recent Legislative Initiatives Battled for Inclusion in the 2014 National
Defense Authorization Act
Several lawmakers have recently pressed for legislation that would
fight sexual assault in the military.198 While numerous lawmakers have
jumped on the political fight, Senator Claire McCaskill and Senator Kirsten
10 U.S.C. § 846.46 (2012).
United States v. Killebrew, 9 M.J. 154, 159 (C.M.A. 1980).
191
10 U.S.C. § 846 (2012), amended by National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014,
Pub. L. No. 113-66, § 1702, 127 Stat. 672, 683 (2013).
192
See MAGGS & SCHENCK, supra note 57, at 217.
193
Id. at 12.
194
Id. at 6.
195
Scalzo, supra note 177; see also supra notes 187–92 and accompanying text.
196
Scalzo, supra note 177.
197
Id.
198
Halimah Abdullah, Survivors of Military Sex Assaults Frustrated with Legislation, CNN (Mar. 10,
2014, 7:00 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/10/politics/military-sex-assault-survivors-speak-out/.
189
190
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Gillibrand have stood at the forefront with opposing legislative proposals. 199
Senator Gillibrand’s proposal, the Military Justice Improvement Act of 2013,
would give prosecutors outside the chain-of-command authority to determine
whether to prosecute a report of sexual assault.200 Senator McCaskill’s
approach, commonly referred to as “modest, conservative, watered-down and
incremental,”201 preserves the authority given to commanders to make
prosecutorial decisions while addressing other, less glaring, criticisms of how
sexual assault cases are currently handled in the military.202
Both proposals were competing for inclusion in the 2014 National
Defense Authorization Act203 (“NDAA”).204 The Senate Armed Services
Committee considered and voted on the proposals for inclusion in the
NDAA.205 Senator McCaskill led the push to defeat Senator Gillibrand’s rival
bill, resulting in Senator McCaskill’s bill contributing to the NDAA.206
2. 2014 National Defense Authorization Act Targets the UCMJ but Misses
the Mark
Under Title XVII of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2014, Congress includes several reforms of the UCMJ relating to
sexual assault prevention and response.207 These reforms, in large part,
address Article 60 and Article 32 of the UCMJ.208 Although congressional
reformations target the UCMJ in an attempt to remediate sexual assault
problems in the military, the instituted changes to both Article 60 and Article
32, as well as changes to procedural requirements, victims’ rights, and the
“Good Soldier Defense,” completely miss the mark and continue allowing
military inaction to remain unchecked.
a. Article 60 Revisions Attempt to Regain Public Confidence

199
Melinda Henneberger, Sen. McCaskill’s Military Sexual-Assault Bill is Meatier than Advertised,
WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/sen-mccaskills-military-sexual-assa
ult-bill-is-meatier-than-advertised/2014/03/09/cdf646b4-a79a-11e3-8d62-419db477a0e6_story.html.
200
Nora Caplan-Bricker, Claire McCaskill Defends Her Controversial Stance on Military Sexual
Assault, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/116899/military-sexual-assa
ult-vote-senator-claire-mccaskill-her-bill.
201
Henneberger, supra note 199.
202
Caplan-Bricker, supra note 200.
203
The NDAA is passed annually, authorizing funding for the Department of Defense for the next year.
The Key Differences: Gillibrand’s Amendment and Levin/McCaskill’s Proposal, PROTECT OUR
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Rather than Protect Sexual Assault Victims
The NDAA changes Article 60 of the UCMJ to reduce the
commander’s ability to modify court-martial findings and sentencing.209
While the provisions do restrict the commander’s ability to modify trial
results, the provisions do not remove this authority completely, allowing
commanders to overturn convictions or reduce the findings of guilt to a lessor
included offense, as well as modify sentencing in certain circumstances.210
Any modification made, however, must be in writing.211 Advocates of this
change to Article 60 claim that the reform “gives victims and the public more
confidence in the system as a whole, which is important in and of itself.”212
However, public perception of the system has little effect if the practice of
overturning convictions and modifying sentences remain in practice and
under the authority of the commander. Certainly commanders play a role in
military culture, which can lead to a change in public perception; however,
commanders are simply not qualified for their current role, which calls for
legal training concerning both law and discretion in criminal prosecutions.213
b. Article 32 Revisions Limit the Scope of the Preliminary
Hearing, but Still Allow for Aggressive Cross-Examination of the
Victim
The NDAA amends Article 32 to require the completion of a
preliminary hearing prior to referral to court-martial for trial.214 The
provisions change Article 32 from an investigation to a preliminary
hearing.215 As such, rather than Article 32 serving as a tool of discovery, the
provisions establish a preliminary hearing with more narrow objectives,
including: “(A) Determining whether there is probable cause to believe an
offense has been committed and the accused committed the offense[;] (B)
Determining whether the convening authority has court-martial jurisdiction
over the offense and the accused[;] (C) Considering the form of [the] charges[;
and] (D) Recommending the disposition that should be made of the case.”216
The new Article 32 is meant to limit the focus and provide a forum
for the government to establish probable cause rather than act as a defense
discovery tool.217 The new Article 32 still allows the accused to submit
evidence and cross-examine witnesses, including the victim; however, the
National Defense Authorization Act § 1702.
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victim is no longer required to testify without the presence of trial counsel.218
The concern over aggressive cross-examination like that, which occurred in
the Naval Academy rape case discussed supra, is addressed solely by placing
a limitation on the scope of the hearing.219
c. Procedural Requirements
The NDAA instituted additional procedural requirements for the
handling of sexual assault cases.220 One such provision requires the
commander to immediately refer a report of sexual assault to the appropriate
military criminal investigation organization involving individuals under the
commander’s chain-of-command.221 Another provision requires completion
of a written incident report within eight days of the report of sexual assault
that would be given to the appropriate investigative agency and the chain-ofcommand above the unit in which the victim served.222
The NDAA also included a provision requiring review of a
commander’s decisions not to refer charges of sexual assault.223 If a staff
judge advocate recommends that charges be referred to a trial by court-martial
and the commander decides not to refer charges, the commander would be
required to forward the case file to the appropriate service Secretary for
review.224 Additionally, the commander would also be required to forward
the case file to the next officer in the chain-of-command with convening
authority for review.225
Proponents of the increased procedural requirements placed on the
commander cite “increased transparency and multiple levels of evaluation and
scrutiny” as reasons why this reform will have the most meaningful impact
on sexual assault cases and victims.226 The effect comes, in large part, from
the fact that the commander’s decision was the final word before these
procedural requirements were adopted.227
While the increase in procedural requirements may have been wellintended, the reforms, in effect, create more problems than offer solutions. A
commander’s consultation with a staff judge advocate is already common
practice in the military.228 More importantly, the staff judge advocate works
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directly under the commander, who also controls the staff judge advocate’s
professional evaluation.229 As such, the threat of pressure to conform to the
commander’s discretion is ever-present, doing little to remove the inherent
bias of the current system.230 Additionally, the staff judge advocate handles a
variety of cases and legal issues and generally is not an expert in one field.231
As such, a staff judge advocate is not in the best position to offer advice on
the strength of a criminal case.232 Ultimately, there is little to no evidence
indicating that these reforms will substantially impact the number of cases
being referred to court-martial or how many cases will go through the
procedural tape and end up on the desk of a particular service secretary.233
d. Codification of Victims’ Rights Provisions Leave Victims
Without Any Recourse and Maintain a Military Justice System that
Breeds Retaliation
The NDAA incorporates provisions amending the UCMJ to include
specific rights for victims of sexual assault.234 However, many of the rights
included among these provisions are already part of the common practices in
the military.235 Proponents believe that the codification of these rights
enhances the confidence in and the credibility of the military justice system. 236
However, the NDAA does not provide victims any cause of action if the
provisions are not followed.237 Major General Mary Kay Hertog, SAPRO
director, stated that if a military member feels that his or her commander is
not adequately addressing a complaint, the military member should go outside
the chain-of-command to the Department of Defense Inspector General.238
However, as California congresswoman, Representative Jackie Speier,
highlights, in the most recent GAO Study, not one case out of 2,594 sexual
assault cases has been reviewed or investigated due to “other higher
priorities.”239 If even going outside the chain-of-command does not result in
adequate investigation, what recourse is a military sexual assault victim left?
Major General Mary Kay Hertog suggests that service members have other
avenues, namely reaching out to their congressmen.240
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Another provision included in the NDAA prohibits retaliation against
an alleged victim or other service member who reports a criminal offense.241
The provision, however, is unlikely to effectively protect against the most
common forms of retaliation, including errant medical diagnoses, refusal of
safety transfers, inappropriate charging of collateral offenses against the
victim, and ostracizing the victim professionally and socially.242 The NDAA,
while providing a broad definition for purposes of drafting the regulation,
does not detail the types of retaliation practically faced by service members.243
Moreover, the provision does not address the fact that many of these
retaliatory acts are committed by superiors within the chain-of-command.244
This provision is most absurd considering the most recent instruction on the
administration of military justice. In the Air Force Guidance Memorandum
to AFI 51-201, Administration of Military Justice, the Sample Commander’s
Recommendation Memorandum for Sexual Assault Offenses Subject to the
Secretary of Defense Withhold Policy explicitly includes a section for the
commander to detail the victim’s background for recommending disposition
for victim misconduct, evidencing the prevalence of victim retaliation.245
Additionally, the NDAA again fails to address how this provision will
be implemented and what, if any, cause of action victims have if retaliation
does occur. Moreover, the statutory language is so broad that actually
enforcing the provision will be an arduous endeavor.246
e. The Use of the “Good Soldier Defense” is Modified to Include
Jury Instructions
The NDAA eliminates “the character and military service of the
accused from the [factors] a commander should consider in deciding how to
dispose of [a sexual assault case].”247 Evidence of a defendant’s good military
character is introduced in order “to provide the basis for an inference that the
accused is too professional a soldier to have committed the offense with which
he is charged.”248
Unfortunately, this amendment will have little to no effect on the
hotly-contested practice of using the “Good Soldier Defense.” The defense
is not actually an affirmative defense; rather, it is a judicial interpretation of
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Mil. R. Evid. 404.249 In practice, the military judge instructs the jury that such
good character evidence may alone raise reasonable doubt. Military rules of
evidence mirror the language of the federal rules of evidence; as such, despite
the amendment, the accused will nonetheless be able to introduce good
military character at trial.250 The new NDAA changes will only affect how
the jury is instructed to interpret such evidence.251 Additionally, good military
character may still be presented in sentencing proceedings as mitigating
evidence and may also trigger specific sentencing instructions from the
military judge.252
C. Flawed Justifications for Command Discretion and Retention of
Prosecutorial Authority
Proponents for retaining authority within the chain-of-command cite
good order and discipline as the primary justifications for that system. 253 The
argument is that command authority results in good order and disciple and
overall operational effectiveness of the unit. Proponents argue that “[t]aking
that power away from commanding officers eliminates an indispensable
authority that cannot be delegated or transferred to another . . . .” 254 They
recognize that commanders have an immense amount of power, but imply that
this degree of control is justified because the commander is responsible for
the training, good order, and discipline of service members in the unit.255 The
commander “exist[s] to carry out the mission, and as such, must retain the full
legal authority to do just that, including but not limited to the authority to refer
cases to court-martial.”256 Proponents tout that “there’s no substitute for a
commander who does it right.”257
The current system of command discretion and prosecutorial
authority, however, creates a conflict of interest that breeds bias and
inefficiency in the system. Proponents for retaining authority within the
chain-of-command underestimate the impact the mixture of roles has, not
only on the commander, but also on the unit and public perception. Elizabeth
Hillman,258 committee participant in the Response Systems Panel on Military
Sexual Assault Subcommittee on the Role of the Commander, explained how
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a mixture of roles negatively affects the unit.259 “This mixture of roles, in
which a convening authority must both protect the overall well-being of a unit
and ensure that unit’s mission is accomplished as well as decide whether a
specific factual context warrants prosecution, creates a conflict that cuts in
different directions, all unhealthy.”260
In United States v. Thomas, the court boldly pronounced that
“[c]ommand influence is the mortal enemy of military justice.”261 The court
observed that command influence could lead to a deprivation of a service
member’s constitutional rights in a number of ways.262 When command
influence is exercised against defense witnesses, “it transgresses the accused’s
right to have access to favorable evidence.”263 When directed against defense
counsel, command influence adversely affects the “accused’s right to
effective assistance of counsel.”264 When directed at a court member or
military judge, command influence “deprive[s] the accused of his right to a
forum where impartiality is not impaired because the court personnel have a
personal interest in not incurring reprisals by the convening authority due to
a failure to reach his intended result.”265 Command influence not only
“involves ‘a corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process,’”266
but the “improper conduct by a commander may be even more injurious than
such activity by a prosecutor”267 given the realities of the chain-of-command
structured military society. One example of improper command influence
occurred during a rape case in which the commander preferred charges
against an airman; however, when the case went to trial, that “same
commander sat directly behind the defendant airman and brought him
water.”268 Not surprisingly, as a not guilty verdict was provided, the
“commander leaped out of his chair, both arms in the air, and screamed
‘yes!’”269
Such a structure has proven that service members are not afforded the
protection they deserve, but the structure instead breeds a culture of
retaliation. The Department of Defense Annual Report on Sexual Assault in
the Military Fiscal Year 2012 reports that of the female victims who chose
not to report, 47% expressed that fear of retaliation or reprisal was the reason
for not reporting their abuse; an additional 43% heard about the negative
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experiences of other victims who reported their abuse.270 Even more telling,
an overwhelming majority of victims who reported a sexual assault indicated
that they experienced professional, social, or administrative retaliation in
response to reporting.271 One case of victim retaliation involved a victim who
reported her sexual assault only to face a no-contact order,272 the commander
testifying at the discharge hearing on behalf of the accused, and the
commander ultimately issuing the victim performance feedback that indicated
she was “too emotional.”273
Another case of victim retaliation involved Marine Corps Lt. Elle
Helmer, who was stationed at Marine Barracks, D.C.274 Donna McAleer,
author of Porcelain on Steel, explained that Marine Barracks, D.C. is
considered the most prestigious unit as it serves as the military’s showcase
ceremonial unit.275 After ceremonies and events, the Marines are expected to
attend receptions and socialize.276 At one such reception, Lt. Helmer was
ordered to drink shots by her commander; she was subsequently raped by a
senior officer.277 An investigation was opened and closed three days later with
no action taken against her rapist.278 However, the base commander opened
a new investigation and Lt. Helmer was charged with conduct unbecoming of
an officer and public intoxication.279 Yet another case of victim retaliation
involved Army service member, Andrea Werner.280 Ms. Werner was an
unmarried woman sexually assaulted by a married man; upon reporting her
assault, Ms. Werner was charged with adultery.281
While victim retaliation should certainly be a concern at the forefront,
sexual assault retaliation comes in a variety of forms. For instance, Capt.
Maribel Jarzabek, a specially appointed Air Force attorney representing
victims of sexual assault, experienced retaliation for her zealous advocacy of
sexual assault victims.282 Capt. Jarzabek publicly supported legislation that
would overhaul the way sexual assault cases are handled in the military and
was consequently the subject of a criminal investigation for wrongfully
advocating a partisan political cause and expressing opinions publicly that
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could undermine public confidence in the Air Force.283 However, public
outrage over this investigation is misplaced. Capt. Jarzabek was out of line
by speaking out on a political issue in her official capacity; however, attention
should be drawn to the more significant issue of the retaliation she
experienced as a special victims attorney. One of Capt. Jarzabek’s first clients
was a staff sergeant who accused an A1C (Airman First Class, a lower rank)
of rape; the commander284 dismissed the case, which prompted Capt. Jarzabek
to draft a memorandum to the commander on behalf of her client.285 In her
memorandum, Capt. Jarzabek criticized the investigating officer and
commented on the commander’s failure to meet with the victim prior to
making his determination.286 In response to her memorandum, the Air Force
reinvestigated the case and transferred jurisdiction to another commander.287
While the reinvestigation was viewed as a military success story at the time,
Capt. Jarzabek reported that she hit a turning point in her career, stating, “The
memo really pissed a lot of people off. I started getting told my performance
was substandard, even though my clients said they were extremely satisfied
with my advocacy.”288
Commanders retain the ultimate legal authority to prosecute sexual
assault in the military, yet lack necessary legal training and rely on the advice
of special judge advocates to evaluate cases; consequently, the current process
is lengthy and inefficient. Rather than placing prosecutorial authority in the
hands of one legally trained individual outside the chain-of-command, the
current system places it with the commander who cannot make determinations
without seeking the help of others. Proponents admit that the court-martial
process today is extremely complicated, involving more expert witnesses than
in years past, as well as forensic and scientific evidence; as such, there is a
need for highly trained legal professionals and a more sophisticated
approach.289 The only approach that can meet the demands of the evolving
court-martial process is the removal of prosecutorial authority from within the
chain-of-command.
Proponents also argue that commanders must retain authority in order
to maintain discipline within their respective units; however, this argument
lacks merit. Commanders may, and often do, discipline within their unit,
aside and apart from disciplinary measures taken during court-martial.
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Additionally, the military has gone to great lengths to incentivize
commanders to take sexual assault seriously; as such, commanders take action
because they feel they have to rather than examining the facts of each case
and making determinations based on merit.290 Indeed, some commanders
only refer cases to court-martial to enforce good order and discipline within
their unit, despite legal advice to the contrary.291 Commanders place “sending
a message” above creating a fair, impartial system of justice for both the
victims and defendants involved.292
While good order and discipline are vital to the mission and the
demand for operational effectiveness is essential in order for the military to
successfully carry out its mission, these ends are not achieved by enabling a
broken process and enacting “reforms” that only address the symptoms rather
than the underlying disease. The most recent provisions in the 2014 NDAA
attack the problems at the surface rather than addressing them head on. In
order to implement a solution that will fully address the broken military
justice system, convening authority must be taken out of the hands of the
commander and the chain-of-command.
D. The Solution: Take Prosecutorial Authority Away from Commanders
and Outside the Chain-of-Command and Institute an Independent Agency to
Prosecute and Punish Sexual Assault
Air Force Brigadier General Wilma L. Vaught articulated that
“sometimes it takes a different kind of action to cause change to come.” 293
Less than 17% of alleged perpetrators were referred to court-martial in fiscal
year 2013 and even fewer were convicted.294 It is poignantly clear that the
current Department of Defense initiatives to combat sexual assault in the
military are failing. The measures taken thus far are not preventing sexual
assault from occurring in the first instance and are not punishing sexual
assault on the backend.
Former Air Force Chief Prosecutor Col. Don Christensen retired from
the Air Force after 23 years to become President of Protect Our Defenders
after witnessing first-hand the failures of the military justice system.295 He
recently spoke on the current failing system, stating the following:
Currently we have [a] system of justice, unlike any other in
the United States, in which a person, who is not a lawyer, and
without specialized training or significant experience in
military justice or criminal investigations makes these
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weighty decisions. For in the military, a commander serving
as convening authority makes the call on whether a case will
be prosecuted, what the charges will be and who sits on the
jury. Instead the convening authority is an officer trained
with an entirely different skill set, usually in waging armed
conflict as a pilot, ship commander or infantry officer. For
that skill set they bring decades of training and experience to
bear. And in that they excel. The same cannot be said for
military justice.296
The solution is glaringly simple: take prosecutorial authority away
from commanders and outside the chain-of-command and place it in the hands
of an independent agency. In so doing, the military will take real steps
towards curtailing sexual assault in the military by creating a system of
accountability that prosecutes and punishes sexual assault while
simultaneously deterring others from engaging in similar criminal activity.
In this one change, the entire disciplinary process shifts from a catch
and release system to a system of justice concerned with fairness and
objectivity, a system which lends itself to heightened standards and values
trust between service members, and a system that ultimately proves beneficial
to the mission. This Comment proposes the establishment of an independent
authority responsible for prosecutorial discretion in military sexual assault
cases. This independent agency would operate in a similar manner as the
Department of Defense investigative units, such as the Air Force Office of
Special Investigations. The independent prosecutorial agency would be given
the authority and independent discretion to assume prosecutorial
responsibility when it concerns military members. The independent
prosecutorial agency and its personnel would operate independent of those
commands the unit serves.
Additionally, the prosecutorial unit would maintain a completely
separate chain-of- command organization in order to ensure thorough and
unbiased investigations and decisions. Moreover, similar to the practices of
the investigative units, the prosecutorial unit would mask rank and grade.
Since the nature of the unit would require frequent interaction with
individuals both junior and senior in grade to them, and often in an adversarial
capacity, the issue of rank cannot impede fair and objective prosecutorial
standards.
The implementation of prosecutorial units would allow individuals
with necessary legal training to evaluate cases, alleviating the lengthiness and
inefficiency of the current system that requires non-legally trained
commanders to rely on the advice of special judge advocates in order to
296
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attempt to accomplish the same task. Prosecutorial units will be better
equipped to handle today’s complicated court-martial process, often
involving more expert witnesses than in years past, as well as forensic and
scientific evidence. The implementation of units comprised of highly trained
legal professionals and a more sophisticated approach will provide both
victims and defendants a fair, impartial system of justice, currently unfound
in the military system.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite implementation of a comprehensive policy to prevent sexual
assault in the military, sexual crimes within the military increased by 34.5%
from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 2012 and reporting dropped from 13.5%
to 9.8%.297 While addressing front-end prevention measures, the military has
taken no real steps toward curtailing sexual assault by creating a system of
accountability that prosecutes and punishes sexual assault. In fiscal year
2013, less than 5% of reported sexual assaults resulted in conviction. Despite
receiving 5,061 reports of sexual assault, the military only convicted 376
perpetrators and only 274 of those perpetrators were confined to jail. Each
incident of sexual assault in the military is detrimental to its mission.
The current process of handling sexual assault cases involves sexual
assault reporting options often unachievable for many service members and
investigators who routinely fail to appropriately respond and investigate
reports of sexual assault. The court-martial process allows for victim abuse
and retaliation with little to no checks on the prosecutorial authority. Current
initiatives and sexual assault prevention and response efforts have been
modest and preserve the authority given to commanders to make prosecutorial
decisions while addressing other, less impactful, criticisms of the system. The
most recent legislative contributions were included in the 2014 National
Defense Authorization Act, which primarily targeted UCMJ provisions, but
completely miss the mark and continue to allow military inaction to remain
unchecked. The amendments attempt to regain public confidence in the
military justice system rather than make meaningful changes that will protect
sexual assault victims. Moreover, Congress maintains a military justice
system that breeds retaliation and leaves victims without any recourse.
The current system of command discretion and prosecutorial
authority creates an inherent conflict of interest that breeds bias and
inefficiency in the system. Commanders retain ultimate legal authority to
prosecute sexual assault in the military, yet lack necessary legal training and
rely on the advice of special judge advocates to evaluate cases, resulting in a
lengthy and inefficient military justice system. Moreover, the structure
cultivates a culture of retaliation. Although proponents argue that the
297
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commander must have the ability to maintain good order and disciple, these
ends are simply not achieved by enabling a broken system and enacting
“reforms” that address the symptoms rather than the underlying disease.
The military has spent time and resources on initiatives such as SARC
and SAPRO, which ultimately have proven to accomplish very little in the
face of military sexual assault. Although the Department of Defense has
created numerous policies under the façade of attempting prevention via
general awareness and training, the time has come to take real steps towards
combating this problem by taking action and creating a system of
accountability that prosecutes and punishes sexual assault. A system of
justice concerned with fairness and objectivity will only be realized once the
Department of Defense establishes an independent agency responsible for
prosecutorial discretion in military sexual assault cases. Only when this
system is achieved will the mission of our military be realized. Anything less
would be a disservice to our service members.
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